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A Study on Secret Sharing with Share Conversion (Abstract)

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1 Background

Secret Sharing (SS) was proposed by Blakley [6] and Shamir [32]. In the SS model, a dealer first divides a *secret* into *shares* and distributes them among *parties*. A qualified coalition of parties can reconstruct the secret, and unqualified coalition of parties can obtain information about that secret. The (t, n) -threshold SS is a common class of SS. In this class, the number of shares is n , any coalition of more than t shares can reconstruct the secret,¹ and t or fewer shares are independent of the secret.

SS has been studied as not only a way to store data securely but also a primitive of other cryptographic protocols such as threshold cryptosystems [18] and fuzzy identity-based encryption for biometrics [31]. Among such applications, multiparty computation (MPC) has been well studied. An MPC aims to compute a function of inputs such as statistical analysis and data mining while any party obtain only the output of the function. Although there are many techniques to construct MPC, we focus on SS-based MPC and we use the term, MPC, as SS-based MPC in the thesis. MPC is typically executed as follows. First, input data are distributed to the parties via SS. When the parties want to compute the function, they interact with each other and obtain a share of the function result. Then the result is reconstructed if needed. Throughout the above steps, the input data are

¹Notice that $t + 1$ shares are required to reconstruct the secret. In the latter sentences of the thesis, we use t as the maximal number of corrupted parties.

never reconstructed. Therefore, by using MPC, the parties can analyze data without leaking any information of the data except the output.

Although MPC has such attractive sense, early studies on MPC [4, 11] had been mainly considered as theoretical interest due to its inefficiency. However, there have been many studies on MPC e.g., [2, 3, 5, 9, 13, 16, 17, 20, 22–24, 27–29], and recently MPC is considered as practical interest. In fact, some practical implementations have been published and confirmed that MPC is efficient enough for certain applications [8–10].

2 Our Application Scenario

Let us consider the system that uses SS to secure data storage with MPC, which is a common model for MPC. For example, a data aggregation of network traffic statistics [10] belongs to the model. In this application, one first shares data for storing securely, and performs MPC that computes statistical analysis when it is needed. In other words, the system has two roles: Secure data storage and secure analyzing system. From the viewpoint of the secure data storage, the storage-size is desired to be small. It means that the share-size of SS should be small. On the other hand, from the viewpoint of the secure analyzing system, it is essential that the parties can perform MPC on the SS efficiently.

Another application is an MPC system with backup. In the application, one shares data via SS and performs MPC by ordinary. When the data are renewed, old shares are still stored for some purpose such as audit. Also in the application, the share-size of SS should be small and the parties can perform MPC on the SS efficiently.

3 Compatibility of Small Share-size and Efficient MPC

We call an SS whose share-size is small as *compact* and an SS on which the parties can perform MPC efficiently as *MPC-friendly*. Our application scenario requires a compact *and* MPC-friendly SS. We survey existing SSs and discuss if an SS satisfies both simultaneously.

3.1 Compact SS

Several compact SSs have been proposed. One of them is a computationally secure SS. Krawczyk [26] proposed a computationally secure SS that uses symmetric-key encryption and information dispersal algorithm (IDA) [30]. In Krawczyk’s scheme, a dealer encrypts a secret with the symmetric-key encryption, the key is distributed through some SS, and the ciphertext is distributed through IDA. If the key size is much smaller than the size of the

secret, Krawczyk’s scheme is compact. Although a computationally secure SS such as Krawczyk’s scheme is secure against only polynomially bounded adversaries, the share-size is almost the same as the optimum one, $\frac{1}{t+1} \|\mathcal{S}\|$ where $\|\mathcal{S}\|$ denotes the size of the secret.

Another compact SS is a ramp scheme that was independently proposed by Blakley and Meadows [7], and Yamamoto [34]. In the ramp scheme, one share can contain multiple secrets so the share-size is small in total. If we set parameters of the ramp scheme so that one share contains L secrets, the share-size is $\frac{1}{L} \|\mathcal{S}\|$.

3.2 MPC-Friendly SS

Next we discuss an SS on which the parties can perform MPC efficiently. Cramer et al. [15] showed that MPC can be conducted on a wide class of SSs called linear SS. However, most practical results of MPC are on the specific SSs, Shamir’s SS or replicated SS [14, 25]. They have certain preferred properties, perfect privacy, homomorphism, and simple arithmetic structure. There have been many practically useful protocols that compute not an arithmetic circuit but a “high-level” function such as bit-decomposition [16, 29], comparison [16, 29], division [9], shuffling [28], sorting [22], floating point [9] and join [27]. These protocols are based on Shamir’s SS, replicated SS, or linear SS including both Shamir’s and replicated SSs. Therefore, Shamir’s SS and replicated SS are MPC-friendly. In fact, to our knowledge, all implementation results of MPC have been constructed based on either these two SSs [8–10].

3.3 Compatibility

To our knowledge, no efficient MPC based on computationally secure SSs such as Krawczyk’s SS has been proposed since most of them have no homomorphism. On the other hands, some MPCs based on the ramp scheme have been proposed so far. Franklin and Yung [19] proposed the protocol that computes parallel multiplications $(a_0b_0, \dots, a_Lb_L)$, where $(a_0, \dots, a_L)$ and $(b_0, \dots, b_L)$ are secretly shared via the ramp scheme. However, the computation is restricted to the pair-wise multiplication, i.e., we cannot compute $a_ib_{i'}$ ($i \neq i'$) with this protocol. Cramer et al. [12] presented the protocol that computes $(\sum_{i+j=0} a_ib_j, \dots, \sum_{i+j=2L} a_ib_j)$, where $(a_0, \dots, a_L)$ and $(b_0, \dots, b_L)$ are secretly shared via the ramp scheme. This protocol can perform wider class of computations compared to [19]. However, their protocol only computes arithmetic circuits. For practical use, protocols that compute high-level functions are essential but have not been proposed on the ramp scheme. Therefore, the compact SSs are not MPC-friendly.

On the other hand, the share-size of Shamir’s SS is $\|\mathcal{S}\|$, which is larger than the ones of the compact SSs. The share-size of Replicated SS is much

larger than the ones of the compact SSs since it is $\binom{n-1}{t} \|\mathcal{S}\|$. Therefore, the MPC friendly SSs are not compact.

Consequently, there is no SS that is both compact and MPC-friendly.

4 Our Contribution

4.1 Approaches

For our application scenarios, we take an approach that one switches two SSs, a compact SS and an MPC-friendly SS, depending on scenes. We adopt the approach in the secure storage with MPC as follows.

- Each user uses an compact SS to store his data in the system.
- When a user wishes to perform MPC, servers perform a conversion protocol that converts stored shares of the compact SS to those of an MPC-friendly SS, and perform MPC on it.
- After performing MPC, the servers perform another conversion protocol that converts shares of the MPC-friendly SS to those of the compact SS.

We also adopt the conversion protocol in the MPC system with backup as follows.

- Each user shares his data via an MPC-friendly SS and performs MPC on it.
- When the data are renewed, the user shares the renewed data via the MPC-friendly SS.
- The servers perform a conversion protocol that converts the old shares of the MPC-friendly SS to those of an compact SS, and keep them for backup.

As a compact SS, we consider a computationally secure SS and the ramp scheme. As an MPC-friendly SS, we consider homomorphic SS and linear SS, which are classes of SSs and both contain Shamir's SS and replicated SS.

4.2 New Compact SS: Variants of Krawczyk's Scheme

Although Krawczyk's scheme is compact, we propose two variants of Krawczyk's scheme, (t, n) -Comp and (t, n) -Comp2. The reason why we show the variants of Krawczyk's scheme is that Krawczyk's scheme cannot be easily converted. Suppose a is distributed through Krawczyk's scheme with the key key . In this situation, $\text{Enc}_{key}(a)$ is distributed via IDA and key is distributed via

an SS, where Enc is the encryption algorithm of a symmetric-key encryption. To convert to an MPC-friendly SS, we have to decrypt $\text{Enc}_{key}(a)$ but the decrypted value should be kept secret. One approach is masking with a randomness: Generate $\text{Enc}_{key}(r)$ and compute $\text{Enc}_{key}(a - r)$ before the decryption. However, this approach cannot be used since a ciphertext is not homomorphic.² Another approach is performing the protocol that computes the decryption algorithm. However, it tends to be inefficient since the decryption algorithm should not have a simple arithmetic structure.

Therefore, we propose the variants of Krawczyk’s scheme so as to convert their shares to MPC-friendly SSs efficiently. Our approach is making use of multiple secret keys and distribute them so that an adversary cannot obtain all keys.

4.3 Conversion Protocol

We propose several conversion protocols between compact SS and MPC-friendly SS. Before explaining individual protocols, we introduce two evaluation criteria of the conversion protocol.

The first criterion is the computational power of adversaries. There are mainly two types of the adversary’s computational power, *computational* and *information-theoretical* security. The former means that the protocol is secure against only polynomially bounded adversaries, and the latter means that the protocol is secure against any (unbounded) adversaries. The latter is stronger security notion so information-theoretical security is preferable from the viewpoint of security. On the other hand, the share-size of a compact SS with computational security tends to be smaller than that of a compact SS with information-theoretic security.

The second criterion is adversary’s behavior. There are mainly two types of the adversary’s behavior,³ called *passive* and *active* security. The passive security means that the protocol is secure against only restricted adversaries that follow the protocol. If the protocol is actively secure, it is secure against adversaries whose behavior is not restricted at all. Passively secure conversion protocols are more efficient than actively secure ones so the passively secure ones are preferable if the passive security is enough. For example, if MPC performed after/before conversion are passively secure such as [8–10], passively secure conversion protocols are suitable. On the other hand, if MPC are actively secure such as [5, 20, 24], actively secure conversion protocols are suitable to achieve the active security in the whole system.

From the above criteria, we have four settings: Computational and

²Note that even if the symmetric key encryption is a stream cipher, a ciphertext is homomorphic only when the key is the same.

³Covert security [1] that is an emerging notion, weaker than active security and stronger than the passive security, have been proposed. However, in the thesis we focus on active and the passive security.

passive, computational and active, information-theoretic and passive, and information-theoretic and active. For each setting, we propose two conversion protocols. One converts a compact SS to MPC-friendly SS and the other is its converse. Therefore, we propose eight conversion protocols in total.

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Author’s Contributions

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- Ryo Kikuchi, Dai Ikarashi, Koki Hamada, and Koji Chida. *Adaptively and unconditionally secure conversion protocols between ramp and linear secret sharing*. IEICE Transactions, 98-A(1):223-231, 2015.

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