@article{CTT100911538,
  author = {Takaaki Abe and Tsuyoshi Onda and Takehiko Yamato},
  title = {Second-Price Auctions with Information Acquisition Costs},
  journal = {SSRN},
  year = 2023,
}

@article{CTT100869742,
  author = {Takaaki Abe},
  title = {Stable Coalition Structures: Characterizations and Applications of Hart and Kurz's Four Stability Concepts},
  journal = {Communications in Economics and Mathematical Sciences},
  year = 2022,
}

@article{CTT100865799,
  author = {Takaaki Abe},
  title = {Stable coalition structures and power indices for majority voting},
  journal = {Journal of Public Economic Theory},
  year = 2022,
}

@article{CTT100865800,
  author = {Takaaki Abe},
  title = {Buck-passing dumping in a garbage-dumping game},
  journal = {Theory and Decision},
  year = 2022,
}

@article{CTT100865801,
  author = {Takaaki Abe and Yukihiko Funaki},
  title = {The unbinding core for coalitional form games},
  journal = {Mathematical Social Sciences},
  year = 2021,
}

@article{CTT100865802,
  author = {Takaaki Abe and Yukihiko Funaki and Taro Shinoda},
  title = {Invitation Games: An Experimental Approach to Coalition Formation},
  journal = {Games},
  year = 2021,
}

@article{CTT100865814,
  author = {Takaaki Abe},
  title = {Stability and Values for Games with Coalition Structures},
  journal = {Economics Letters},
  year = 2021,
}

@article{CTT100865813,
  author = {Takaaki Abe},
  title = {Cartel Formation in Cournot Competition with Asymmetric Costs: A Partition Function Approach},
  journal = {Games},
  year = 2021,
}

@article{CTT100865805,
  author = {Takaaki Abe},
  title = {The Projective Core of Symmetric Games with Externalities},
  journal = {International Journal of Game Theory},
  year = 2020,
}

@article{CTT100865803,
  author = {Abe, T. and Takaaki Abe},
  title = {Axiomatizations of coalition aggregation functions},
  journal = {Mathematical Social Sciences},
  year = 2020,
}

@article{CTT100865807,
  author = {Abe, T. and Liu, S. and Takaaki Abe},
  title = {Monotonic core allocation paths for assignment games},
  journal = {Social Choice and Welfare},
  year = 2019,
}

@article{CTT100865804,
  author = {Abe, T. and Takaaki Abe},
  title = {Population monotonic allocation schemes for games with externalities},
  journal = {International Journal of Game Theory},
  year = 2019,
}

@article{CTT100865806,
  author = {Abe, T. and Takaaki Abe},
  title = {Decomposing a balanced game: A necessary and sufficient condition for the nonemptiness of the core},
  journal = {Economics Letters},
  year = 2019,
}

@article{CTT100865808,
  author = {Abe, T. and Nakada, S. and Takaaki Abe},
  title = {The weighted-egalitarian Shapley values},
  journal = {Social Choice and Welfare},
  year = 2018,
}

@article{CTT100865810,
  author = {Abe, T. and Takaaki Abe},
  title = {Stable coalition structures in symmetric majority games: a coincidence between myopia and farsightedness},
  journal = {Theory and Decision},
  year = 2018,
}

@article{CTT100865811,
  author = {Abe, T. and Nakada, S. and Takaaki Abe},
  title = {Monotonic redistribution: Reconciling performance-based allocation and weighted division},
  journal = {International Game Theory Review},
  year = 2017,
}

@article{CTT100865809,
  author = {Abe, T. and Takaaki Abe},
  title = {Consistency and the core in games with externalities},
  journal = {International Journal of Game Theory},
  year = 2017,
}

@article{CTT100865812,
  author = {Abe, T. and Funaki, Y. and Takaaki Abe},
  title = {The non-emptiness of the core of a partition function form game},
  journal = {International Journal of Game Theory},
  year = 2016,
}