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Title
Japanese:Cartel Formation in Cournot Competition with Asymmetric Costs: A Partition Function Approach 
English:Cartel Formation in Cournot Competition with Asymmetric Costs: A Partition Function Approach 
Author
Japanese: 阿部貴晃.  
English: Takaaki Abe.  
Language English 
Journal/Book name
Japanese:Games 
English:Games 
Volume, Number, Page Vol. 12    No. 1    pp. 14
Published date Feb. 1, 2021 
Publisher
Japanese: 
English: 
Conference name
Japanese: 
English: 
Conference site
Japanese: 
English: 
Official URL http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/g12010014
 
DOI https://doi.org/10.3390/g12010014
Abstract <jats:p>In this paper, we use a partition function form game to analyze cartel formation among firms in Cournot competition. We assume that a firm obtains a certain cost advantage that allows it to produce goods at a lower unit cost. We show that if the level of the cost advantage is “moderate”, then the firm with the cost advantage leads the cartel formation among the firms. Moreover, if the cost advantage is relatively high, then the formed cartel can also be stable in the sense of the core of a partition function form game. We also show that if the technology for the low-cost production can be copied, then the cost advantage may prevent a cartel from splitting.</jats:p>

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