<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title>
<jats:p>We consider the allocation problem of infinitely divisible resources with at least three agents. For this problem, Thomson (<jats:italic>Games and Economic Behavior</jats:italic>, 52: 186-200, 2005) and Doğan (<jats:italic>Games and Economic Behavior</jats:italic>, 98: 165-171, 2016) propose “simple” but not “procedurally fair” game forms which implement the “no-envy” solution in Nash equilibria. By contrast, Galbiati (<jats:italic>Economics Letters</jats:italic>, 100: 72-75, 2008) constructs a procedurally fair but not simple game form which implements the no-envy solution in Nash equilibria. In this paper, we design a both simple and procedurally fair game form which implements the no-envy solution in Nash equilibria.</jats:p>
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